Leading for the sake of leading? The role of the European Union in climate change negotiations.
Despite being a block with one of the highest per capita emissions, since the early 1990s, the European Union has presented itself as a leader on climate change negotiations, mostly using its soft power tools through directional leadership such as setting a good example for others. The EU has been promoting some of the most comprehensive environmental legislation in the world and encouraging the international community into cohesion. Former EU Commissioner, Stavros Dimas, remarked Europe’s climate change leadership stating “This is not just leadership for the sake of leadership, or because we think we can fight climate change on our own — we clearly can’t. The EU’s commitment and success have been an inspiration to our global partners.” Which are the reasons behind this behavior? What does it gain from taking this role? Is the EU is truly a leader, or it is just a self-proclaimed role that does not go beyond the European borders?
What makes the EU a leader?
The EU first proved to have the capacity to lead United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations with the achievements of the Kyoto protocol, which is thought to be the most significant diplomatic victory of the EU in negotiations terms. The EU was able to save the Kyoto Protocol, which was believed to be dead before it even entered into force, persuading the so-called Gang of Four, Russia, Japan, Canada, and Australia into agreement. The reluctance of these four states came with the withdrawal of the US, which, in a way, shows the influential power that rested in this superpower (Langtree, 2012). Such were the efforts to persuade the US as well that the final draft of the Kyoto protocol reflected more US preferences rather than EU, including the introduction of a commitment period 2008–2012, the creation of three market-based mechanisms, and the accounting of emissions and removals of GHGs from forests. So, even though the EU massively fail into stopping the US to withdraw from the agreement, it was a big success that, after all, the protocol entered into force (Oberthür, 2011). Nonetheless, the EU promoted ambitious external policies and, more often than not, it did so without having agreed on internal policies, and thus, with no idea on how to fulfill the targets that it has set itself. Therefore, the only way to achieve them was by resorting to the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), which it had previously labeled as the worst possible option (Costa, 2018; Jordan et al, 2012).
Notwithstanding the EU negotiation win in the Kyoto Protocol, its role made a 180 degree turn during the Copenhagen Accord. The EU tends to present itself as a dominant player due to its representation of 28 nations, yet it falls in the inherent dilemma in which its strengths tend to be also its primary source of weaknesses. The European Union negotiates in UN climate talks as one entity, but it masks an internal division: the northern and western members and the eastern members. Many of these Member States have national, state-owned energy companies whose monopolies are threatened by the agreements and goals imposed by the EU internally and internationally. So, while ‘environmentally-minded’ countries, such as Germany or the Netherlands, takes the lead, the ‘environmental laggards’, like Poland, lags behind (Unbehaun, 2016; Barichella, 2017). This façade of unity that plays the EU is precisely one of the reasons that made the EU fail in leading the Copenhagen climate talks. The EU was speaking with different voices while the other nations used one. It lacked a cohesive and influential spokesperson, and thus thought to not be a compelling actor by the rest of the negotiators. Moreover, it pursued a normative agenda and had unrealistic expectations. And, as a result, the EU was incapable of building coalitions and was left out of the discussions between the US, led by the Obama administration, and the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China), which resulted in the final draft of the Copenhagen Accord (Kilian & Elgström, 2010).
At the Paris Agreement (COP21), the EU learned from its past mistakes and this time was able to join coalitions with the US and China, the main developers of the accord’s institutional design, and Canada and the High Ambition Coalition, the ones pushing for a more ambitious deal (Parker & Karlosonn, 2018). However, the internal division of the EU was showed once again, when some members ratified quickly, while others took much longer. As a result, the slow delivery by some of the member states on promises made has damaged the credibility of the EU leadership (Barichella, 2017). More recently, in December 2018, the COP 24 was held in Katowice, and with the withdrawal of the US with the Trump administration from the Paris Agreement, the EU was able to show its capability leadership once again again. The EU was able to find common ground and persuade the hesitant China towards its ambitious proposal and the the result was the ‘Katowice Climate Package’ which is a roadmap that aims to deliver on the Paris objectives of holding global warming to well below 2°C while pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5°C (Parker & Karlosonn, 2018).
Leadership: External factors
The world of the 90s, when the climate change negotiations started, was under an apparent unipolar system led by the US. Therefore, when the US showed little to no interest in climate change talks and other nations were unable to take over, it was easy for the EU to be declared as a leader in climate change. The EU saw this as an opportunity to become a global actor in the international sphere, which had been its ambition for a while. The EU was a new entity itself with a new seat at the table and wanted to be taken as a serious and legitimate actor at the international level (Oberthür & Roche, 2008).
The EU saw climate change as a well-suited issue to pursue its global leadership due to its synchronization with the EU’s agenda, focused on multilateralism and sustainable development. As David Miliband, a labor politician once touted as a future British prime minister stated: “one is a cause looking for a champion, the other is a champion in search of a cause” (Rankin, 2017). It gave the EU a chance to show the rest of the international community the possibility of a thriving way global governance with multilateralism and international law under the umbrella of climate change (Oberthür & Roche, 2008; Van Schaik, 2012). These goals became even more critical after the failure of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) in 2005; it was an opportunity to reinforce their legitimacy and renew the European integration method (Oberthür & Roche, 2008). So, as a result, the EU’s climate policy, particularly in the period 2005–2009, became strongly associated with the EU’s self-perception and identity. For the EU, agreeing on legally binding emission reduction targets at the international level meant more than progress and action to reduce the impact of humans on earth, it was seen as the possibility of supranational inter-state cooperation, which is precisely how the EU works (Van Shaik, 2012).
Leadership: Internal factors
Besides clear identity reasons, the EU also had domestic and material benefits out of becoming a leader in climate change issues. Firstly, it was a moment where Europe as a peace project –its initial raison d’être– was no longer a selling point for younger generations who had grown up without wars. Henceforth, another great idea to legitimate its existence and justify its added value in front of its citizens was needed, and environment appeared as the issue that could best reconnect European leaders with disaffected citizens (Rankin, 2017). Secondly, different studies have shown that people in wealthier nations are more likely to take actions to protect the environment; they are thought to have more resources and willingness to pay more taxes and among other things (Lo, 2015). And in fact, in the 90s Europe experienced a rise of green parties within its countries, which could be linked to the concern of EU citizens about the environment. So, leading climate change was a way for the EU to keep its citizens pleased and show them that their concerns, were also EU concerns (Van Shaik, 2012).. Thirdly, Europe had a very high dependence on foreign energy, which experienced a drastic price increase in 2005, mainly due to the political development of countries from the Middle East and Russia and their awareness of Europe’s energy dependence. The outcome of the energy security agenda helped to reinforce the climate agenda, especially regarding strategies that proposed energy capability and alternative sources of energy (Oberthür & Roche, 2008).
So, is it leading for the sake of leading?
All things considered, the decision of the EU to lead climate change negotiations has been more opportunistic than based on a real commitment to the cause. The EU is not leading the global climate negotiations for the pure sake of leading, but that it has some personal interests behind, both external and internal. The decision to position itself as the leading actor was not rational, but a political one. Although the ambitious outcomes it promotes are ultimately quite positive for the defense of the environment, it is not its main priority. However, the actual leadership effectiveness of the EU is turbid. The EU has been unable to persuade critical governments to match its ambitious goals, and even though the diplomatic process is making progress, climate action remains at an adequate rate to prevent the dangerous effects of climate change. Nevertheless, it cannot be assumed that the EU’s performance in the UN climate negotiations gives an ultimate outlook on its role in international climate negotiations. Both, the EU and climate negotiations are pretty new in the global system, with little more than two decades of history. This idea of leadership or failure of leading on bargaining by the EU is based fundamentally on Kyoto or Copenhagen, and now, Paris and Katowice. Nonetheless, if the EU wants to guide climate change negotiations effectively, it first needs to find a single coherent voice.
